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I Introduction
In this article, we try to uncover an emerging rela-
tionship between the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) and the International Organisation for
Standardisation (ISO). We see this relationship as
being particularly illustrative of the profound
changes which are occunng in international society,
in the organisation of global governance more specif-
ically, and in the way environmental and other regu-
lations will be introduced into a liheralised global
economy Not surprisingly, new private actors and
corresponding actor arrangements emerge in parallel.
In the first section, we will present the underlying
dynamics of both deregulation and environmental
protection, leading to the creation of global gover-
nance mechanisms, as well as to a re-organisation of
international society In the second section, we will
show how standards, and in our case environmental
standards, might well appear as being the new, most
ideal form of global regulatory mechanisms. In the
third section, we discuss the ISO and why standards
seem to be ideal for a whole set of global private and
public actors. We then show, in section four, the
emerging linkage between the WTO, the promoter
of global deregulation so far, and the ISO, apparently
the solution to global regulatory problems. In the
conclusion, the new type of actor arrangements, as
promoted by these new regulatory mechanisms, will
be highlighted and critically analysed.
2 Liberalisation and the
Environment: Global Governance
and the Re-Organisation of
International Society
The present connection between the WTO and
ISO 14000 - a series of new environmental stan-
dards promoted by the ISO - is, in our view, a
result of the dual process towards freer trade on
the one hand, and the privatisation of global envi-
ronmental protection on the other. Indeed,
international and, increasingly, global trade has
grown steadily over the past years, resulting from
technological progress, especially in the informa-
tion technologies, from cheap oil and the subse-
quent low transport costs, from deregulation and
the privatisation in particular of public enter-
prises, and from trade liberalisation through suc-
cessive multilateral negotiations in the framework
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT) and the WTO agreements. Given that tariffs
are no longer effective barriers to trade, economists
and other promoters of free trade have identified new
forms of trade barriers, whose only limit is human
imagination and economic theory As a result, GATT
(since the Tokyo Round) and then the \VTO, have
been looking out for non-tariff trade barriers, such as,
for example, technical or regulatory harriers to trade.
On the other hand, environmental degradation has
increased parallel to industrial development, and
has further accelerated as a result of increased trade.
Consequently, since the 1970s, environmental reg-
ulations have been introduced, first at national and
later at international levels. At the international
level environmental problems increasingly
appeared overwhelming and the need emerged to
overcome fragmented national, regional, and
international environmental regulations and to
think of new and effective partnerships among all
economic actors, including governments, business
and NGOs. In other words, and alongside a process
of industrial development, trade liberalisation, and
deregulation, we observe the growing need to regu-
late, albeit only in environmental matters. Thus
there is a growing tension between the two trends
of deregulation on the one hand and re-regulation
on the other.
The search for new and private forms and mecha-
nisms of (environmental) regulation, such as for
example (environmental) standards, must be seen
as an attempt to seek ways out of this tension
between deregulation and re-regulation. But this
solution, if it is one, has a history There are, in our
view, two different elements leading up to this solu-
tion, namely (1) the growing privatisation of
international (environmental) politics, charac-
tensed by the erosion of traditional nation-state
'command and control' policy mechanisms and the
growing role of private and non-state actors; and (2)
the re-organisation of international society We will
address the latter point in this section and the for-
mer point in the next section.
The past 50 years have been characterised by the
expansion of international institutions and public
actors, carrying out international policies, often on
a self-appointed basis. Since the Second World War,
the United Nations with its various agencies has
been paralleled by the Bretton Woods Institutions,
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i.e., the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, and by a process of trade deregulation pro-
moted by the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs, leading in 1995 to the creation of the World
Trade Organisation (Krueger 1998). All three types
of institutions have developed in parallel over the
past 50 years, sometimes with overlapping missions
and activities - a process which can probably best
be understood in institutional development terms.
For example, the United Nations, with its multiple
agencies, became more and more fragmented and
spread increasingly thin, which appeared particu-
larly problematic when funds became scarce. On
the other hand, the Bretton Woods Institutions,
especially the World Bank, increasingly invaded UN
development territory by subsuming social devel-
opment and sustainability into its economic devel-
opment agenda. The GATT finally developed a
powerful dynamic of trade liberalisation and, by so
doing, somewhat undermined the agendas of both
the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions.
Today, in the era of economic, ecological, cultural,
and technological globalisations, international pub-
lic actors need to reposition and, to a certain extent,
redefine themselves within the parallel emergence
of new global governance mechanisms involving,
among others, TNCs and NGOs. Such reposition-
ing is made necessary by new challenges resulting
from globalisation, but also in the light of public
pressure, especially in the case of the World Bank
(Cavanagh, et al. 1994), as well as in the light of
lobbying by TNCs, but also because of serious
financial pressures in the case of the UN (Alger,
1998; South Centre 1997). Today we can observe
an institutional rearrangement, which makes
international public institutions regroup around
three key issues, all of which are crucial for the
management of international public affairs in the
years to come. These issues are security, sustainable
development, and trade regulation.
Indeed, it is clear that the UN, under heavy finan-
cial pressure, is currently refocusing on issues of
security, i.e., basically peace and war, the safeguard-
ing of international boundaries, human rights pro-
tection, and humanitarian intervention.
Consequently, one of the UN core mandates,
development, is being abandoned and taken over
by the Bretton Woods Institutions, especially the
World Bank, which is better equipped financially to
do the job. Indeed, the World Bank, the UN
Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN
Environment Programme (UNEP), already linked
through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF),
seem lo be regrouping around the issue of sustain-
able development, which might well lead to the for-
mation of a new 'Earth Bank'. Finally, there is the
issue of trade and trade regulation. Having actively
promoted trade liberalisation, the GATT and the
WTO are now increasingly coming under pressure
from public opinion, developing countries, and
TNCs to reintroduce some sort of trade regulation.
In order to do so, however, the WTO will have to
regroup with organisations such as the ISO. The
remainder of this article will focus on this third
dimension of institutional rearrangements, i.e.,
around issues of trade re-regulation.
The environment, as a cross-cutting issue, relates to
all three dimensions, Indeed, environmental degra-
dation has become an issue of security - hence the
now famous term 'environmental security' (Finger
1991). Examples are found in the potential conflicts
arising from scarcity of natural resources (such as
water), or from transnational environmental dam-
age (such as nuclear disasters) (Timoshenko 1992:
426). Second, since the UN Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), environ-
mental protection has also been reframed in terms
of 'sustainable development'. UN bodies such as the
UNDP, and in particular the World Bank, have been
keen to promote corresponding (sustainable) devel-
opment projects. Third, the environment also per-
tains to trade: indeed, while environmental
protection was and still is considered to be an
impediment to trade, it is also becoming (as we will
show below) an argument, or perhaps an excuse,
for re-regulating trade.
3 Deregulation and Re-regulation:
From Trade Barriers to Standards
In this section we want to trace the fundamental
shift from deregulation to re-regulation. Parallel to
this change, what were previously labelled as barri-
ers to trade have been reframed as international
standards, which are considered beneficial for trade.
At the same time, as we will see in the next section,
we observe what can be called a process of privati-
sation of international environmental governance'
(Clapp 1998). The result of both trends combined
lo
will ultimately make privately defined standards
acceptable tools for global trade regulation.
Let us recall that the overall trend since the emer-
gence of the GATT has been to liberalise global
trade. Starting with agricultural products, the
Uruguay Round and the process of liberalisation
have gradually embraced all products, including,
for instance, services. In this overall process of trade
liberalisation, the removal of technical barriers to
trade (IBIs) plays an important role. TBTs are cur-
rently the main remaining barriers to free interna-
tional trade. Although many of these barriers are
not direct and open measures of protectionism,
their effects may be characterised as trade barriers.
Within the GATT of 1947, in Article XI, non-tariff
or technical barriers to trade were clearly forbidden.
Articles XX and XXI only allow the state to use non-
tariff measures so as to protect its public order and
security interests.
During the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, the elimination of TBTs was one of the
major concerns for the parties. An agreement on
technical barriers to trade was finally concluded in
1979 and entered into force in 1980. This agree-
ment was part of a subsidiary agreement called the
Standards Code dealing with the problem of non-
tariff barriers to trade. But the Standards Code had
two facets: (1) It proposed that product standards,
certification systems, test methods, and labelling
processes be as 'unrestrictive' to trade as possible
(Murray 1997: 605); (2) On the other hand, the
Standards Code already encouraged the establish-
ment of international standards and the use of these
standards by contracting parties as a basis for
national standards. Mobilising this argument in
favour of international standards, the Standards
Code sought to facilitate the harmonisation of
national standards, thereby ultimately facilitating
trade (Charnovitz 1993: 274).
The main ideas of the Tokyo Standards Code were
included in the GATT 1994. which established the
present WTO. Indeed, part of the WTO Agreement
is the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
which seeks to ensure that regulations, standards,
testing, and certification procedures do not create
unnecessary obstacles to trade; and in order to har-
monise these technical standards as broadly as pos-
sible, Member States should actively participate in
the elaboration of technical rules by relevant
international organisations (Article 2.6 and Annex
3). Also, in its preamble, the TBT Agreement clearly
recognises the importance of international stan-
dards; and under the TBT Agreement national stan-
dards-setting organisations are encouraged to
employ international standards, which already exist
or whose 'completion is imminent' (Article 2.4).
Moreover, the Agreement invites the signatory gov-
ernments to ensure that the standardising bodies in
their countries accept and comply with a 'Code of
Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and
Application of Standards', embodied in Annex 3 to
the Agreement.
In short, free regional and global trade is making
the need for re-regulation increasingly obvious.
While the GATT of 1947 was clearly an agreement
designed to promote deregulation, the present
WTO seeks to prevent or to face some of the conse-
quences of deregulation, especially in the social and
environmental areas (e.g., Charnovitz 1997a: 112).
An obvious illustration of the change that has
occurred recently, and which now seems to push
towards re-regulation can be found in the WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),
which encourages Member States to use interna-
tional standards instead of national ones.
Consequently, WTO is presently becoming a 'world
competition agency', deregulating in some areas
and regulating in others (Chamovitz 1997a: 112).
However, the re-regulating powers of the WTO are
very limited, if not absent. Indeed, while it can
make standards acceptable as part of an interna-
tional trade regime, it cannot set the standards
itself. The WTO must, therefore, look for other
actors, preferably international ones, and, as we
shall see, private ones, who can do the job.
4 The Privatisation of
Environmental Regulation
This section will illustrate the process of privatisation
of environmental regulation, leading to the definition
of environmental standards as currently promoted by
the lSO. Not surprisingly, these are precisely the type
of standards which the WTO might be looking for
when trying to re-regulate global trade.
When looking at the overall history of environmen-
tal regulation, it seems obvious that there has been
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a growth in environment protection measures at the
international level and a parallel reduced direct
involvement of states. This has occurred in several
stages. Originally, international organisations and
multilateral conventions used the traditional state
machinery to implement environmental measures.
In a second stage, international institutions used
NGOs for the direct implementation of environ-
ment commitments in certain countries. Now we
are entering a third stage, whereby states transfer
the implementation and sometimes even monitor-
ing of this process directly to private economic
actors from business and industry
As a result, voluntary initiatives by business and
industry have been used over the past decade in
order to improve environmental performance.
Many kinds of such voluntary initiatives are avail-
able to companies and governments. Among them,
voluntary standards are gradually becoming
requirements for access to the international market.
There is in fact much support for such voluntary
standards. Economic actors (industry and business
organisations) support them because they facilitate
trade by reducing market fragmentation
(Charnovitz 1993: 271), but also because it
increases their power along the supply chain. NGOs
find them appealing because they offer a relatively
easy way to influence environment protection by
directly pressuring companies which do not comply
with the standards they have committed to. For
states, standards and corresponding certification is
a way to transfer implementation and monitoring
functions (and costs) directly onto the companies.
Indeed, voluntary standards which are enforced by
indirect pressure (market-based incentives and dis-
incentives) reduce the domestic costs of public leg-
islation and enforcement, by shifting enforcement
costs to the producers of pollution, rather than to
the taxpayer (Pinckard 1997: 439). Finally, certifi-
cation bodies such as Société Générale de
Surveillance (SGS) or Ventas Ltd. are interested in
standards because they can make profits by certify-
ing private companies.
The UNCED was a great opportunity for large enter-
prises, particularly TNCs, to take steps, endorsed by
Agenda 21, to publicly demonstrate that their activ-
ities conform and contribute to the goals of sustain-
able development. It is notable that the majority of
the industry association environmental codes and
guidelines were actually issued in the months
before and after the Rio Conference (UNCTAD
1996: 2). Indeed UNCED provided the necessary
impetus for action by referring to the need for
international standards during various UNCED
preparatory committees (Roht-Arriaza 1995a: 501).
In response, the ISO and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) established an
ad hoc Strategic Advisory Group on Environment
(SAGE), which recommended, in its October 1992
session, the establishment of a formal Technical
Committee (IC) on the development of environ-
mental standards, to be known as the IC 207. It is
in this context and in the aftermath of UNCED, that
a new type of environmental regulation, directly
promoted by TNCs, has emerged. 150 14000 is
indeed a new type of environmental regulation,
which no longer focuses on the a posteriori control
of emissions, but rather on operational techniques
in the industry (Asher and Gupta 1998: 315). ISO
14000 is thus the prototype of privatised environ-
mental regulation (e.g., Krut and Gleckman 1998).
Traditionally, ISO, a private body (and not an
international organisation, as its name misleadingly
implies), set technical standards. However, since
the 1980s with the ISO 9000 series, the ISO
embarked on a new trend, evaluating the systems
by which products are produced, rather than the
products themselves. Owing to the success of ISO
9000 - the number of ISO 9000 certificates grew
by nearly 40% in 1997 - and in the context of the
UNCED process mentioned above, ISO has finally
focused its attention on environmental issues with
ISO 14000, a series of international and voluntary
environmental management standards. To recall,
the TC 207 was composed of six sub-committees
which addressed the following aspects of environ-
mental management: Environmental Management
Systems (EMS), Environmental Auditing & Related
Investigations (EA&RI), Environmental Labels and
Declarations (EL), Environmental Performance
Evaluation (EPE), Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) and
Terms and Definitions (T&D). The ISO 14000
series of standards consists of several guideline
standards and one compliance standard, the ISO
14001 Environmental Management Systems (EMS)
(Fredericks and McCallum 1995). The ISO 14001
specifies the basic requirements of an EMS that a
company must meet in order to become ISO 14'OOO
certified. In order to obtain such a certification, a
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company can either declare itself in compliance
with the 14001 EMS standard, or it can have an
independent third party confirm that the company
management is in conformity with the requirements
of the ISO 14001 (Pinckard 1997: 435).
lt appears that for various reasons the ISO 14000
standards have become very successful, not least
the fact that ISO is looked at by the WTO as a
potential reregulator of global trade, as we demon-
strate below
5 The WTOIISO Relationship
So far we have identified two parallel, yet still more
or less separate trends: on the one hand the trend
towards re-regulation as embodied by the WTO
and on the other the trend towards the privatisation
of environmental regulation as embodied by the
150 14000 standard. Both trends seem to meet
today in an emerging WTO/ISO relationship in
which a private body will increasingly become a
legitimate actor for setting trade standards. In this
section, we would like to illustrate this emerging
relationship.
We have already mentioned above the Agreement
on TBTs of the WTO, which recognises the impor-
tance of international standard-setting. Annex 3 of
the TBT Agreement refers to a 'Code of Good
Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, and
Application of Standards'. On behalf of the WTO,
the ISO (and the IEC) is mandated to record the
acceptance of this code of good practice by the
national institutes (Favre 1998: 2). Furthermore,
the monitoring and enforcement of the TBT
Agreement is a function assumed by the WTO
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. In this
context, the ISO and IEC are invited to attend the
Committee as observers and, through that particu-
lar channel, regularly explain the developments
occurring in international standardisation to the
WTO members (Favre 1998: 2). To further demon-
strate the degree of WTOIISO cooperation, it is
worth mentioning that the ISO is jointly organising
with the WTO a series of regional seminars to
assess market interest for developing international
standards so as to facilitate trade. During the sec-
ond such seminar in Buenos Aires in October
1998, the ISO vice-president highlighted the spe-
cific importance of international standards for the
global integration of the different national and
regional markets. In parallel, the Advisor to the ser-
vice trade division of the WTO explained that
WTO's objective was to ensure that standards do
not create unnecessary barriers to trade, which is
the reason why common standards are important.
This not only perfectly illustrates the shift from
trade barriers to standards, but also the emerging
link between the WTO and the ISO.
The argument that international standards are good
for free trade, while national standards are trade
barriers, is now also made by OECDb Committee
on Standards and Conformity Assessment. In a sur-
vey which this committee conducted on standards
and manufacturers from developed countries, com-
petition on the global market, they say, is restricted
by a plethora of national standards, certification and
testing requirements applying to consumer goods
(Schwamm 1997: 13). A global standard should
reduce the risk of countries using environmental
restrictions as a pretence for trade restrictions. But
what makes the ISO specifically relevant to the TBT
Agreement is that the WTO generally considers that
voluntary international standards set by a recog-
nised body, such as the ISO, are 'standards' (Clapp
1998: 304). On the contrary it considers those set
by governments, intergovernmental organisations,
or UN bodies not as standards but rather as 'techni-
cal regulations' (Annex 1), which are seen by the
TBT Agreement as creating potential trade barriers
(Article 2).
Moreover, environmental standardisation in particu-
lar is going to be an integral part of the international
trade framework within the WTO. For example, the
United States Environmental Protection Agency has
already considered a number of options involving
ISO 14000. One of the proposals was to require ISO
14000 certification as a prerequisite for entrance
into regulatory reform pilot programmes such as
Project XL (Murray 1997: 608). Consequently stan-
dards may be seen as non-tariff trade barriers, given
that foreign companies unable to meet ISO 14'OOO
certification could be blocked from many US mar-
kets. Quite interestingly the TBT Agreement identi-
fies protection of the environment (Article 2.2.)
Such a de facto consequence is, however, in direct
contradiction with Article 12 §3 of the TBT Agreement,
which indicates that Contracting Parties, ïn the process
of standards and technical regulations making, must take
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among the 'legitimate objectives' that can justify the
use of trade restrictive regulations by states.
Logically this should not have a legal value, given
that the ISO standards are considered to be volun-
tary standards, and not mandatory technical regula-
tions. However, in the case of domestic authorities
including ISO 14000 as a requirement for foreign
companies to get access to domestic markets, the
allegation of protectionist barriers to trade could be
avoided before a dispute settlement panel, because
environment concern is a 'legitimate objective'
under the TBT Agreement.
6 Conclusion: Towards New Actor
Arrangements
Being of private origin, ISO 14000 is still a volun-
tary standard. But, this may only be a matter of
time. Indeed, such private standards may affect the
public sphere in many ways: global or regional
trade agreements may explicitly recognise them,
government regulations may refer to them for the
definition of terms, and government procurement
rules may adopt them (Roht-Arriaza, 1995a: 486).
Furthermore, market pressure from consumers,
financiers, insurers and competitors may become so
strong that corresponding standards turn into pre-
requisites for companies wanting to do business in
larger markets. As a result, ISO 14000, for exam-
ple, may de facto become a non-tariff barrier to
trade, keeping out small and medium sized enter-
prises, as well as companies from developing coun-
tries1. Moreover, there is a 'follow the leader'
pattern, which means that more and more compa-
nies certify to the standards, and in turn require cer-
tification from their suppliers and trading partners
(Murray 1997: 614). Consequently, TNCs can
establish and enhance a monopoly position by
imposing international standards (Finger and
Kilcoyne 1997). On the other hand, ISO 14000
might actually facilitate compliance with environ-
mental laws by leading to uniform approaches to
environmental management, as well as by harmon-
ising international environmental commitments
and environmental impact assessments worldwide.
In addition, the standards call for continual environ-
mental improvement: on the one hand, the certified
into account the specific needs of developing members,
so that these standards and technical regulations do not
create unnecessary barriers to exports from developing
members.
company needs to comply with local regulations,
while on the other such compliance should result in
the continued evolution and improvement of
national environmental protection (Pinckard 1997:
440). This is called the 'race to the top' perspective,
i.e., a movement towards more and more protective
environmental regulation. This, at least, is the argu-
ment used to support voluntary environmental stan-
dards, such as ISO 14000.
The emerging relationship between the WTO and
the ISO in the field of environment protection is,
in our view, a direct result of economic globalisa-
tion and the subsequent transformation of the role
of the nation-state in international economic poi-
icy Indeed, historically governments have relied
upon public commitments such as treaties and
domestic regulations in order to address global
environmental issues. But the globalisation of eco-
nomic activity and trade in particular, has some-
what re-arranged the power relationships among
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